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ABSTRACT 
The Spitzer Science Center (SSC) Software Science Operations System (SOS) is a large, complex software system.  
Over 1.2 million lines of code had been written for the SOS by time of launch (August 2003).  The SSC uses a defect 
tracking tool called GNATS to enter defect reports and change requests.  GNATS has been useful beyond just tracking 
defects to closure.  Prior to launch a number of charts and graphs were generated using metrics collected from GNATS.  
These reports demonstrated trends and snapshots of the state of the SOS and enabled the SSC to better identify risks to 
the SOS and focus testing efforts.  This paper will focus primarily on the time period of Spitzer’s launch and In Orbit 
Checkout.  It will discuss the metrics collected, the analyses done, the format the analyses was presented in, and lessons 
learned.  This work was performed at the California Institute of Technology under contract to the National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The Spitzer Space Telescope is the final mission in NASA's Great Observatories Program.   On August 25, 2003, Spitzer 
became the largest infrared telescope ever launched into space.  Spitzer has an 85-centimeter telescope and three 
cryogenically cooled science instruments.  The Spitzer Science Center (SSC), located at the California Institute of 
Technology, is responsible for science operation including proposal calls, observatory scheduling, data processing, and 
data archiving.  In order to accomplish this task the SSC has developed a complex Science Operations System (SOS).  
Creation and maintenance of the SOS required development of approximately two million lines of code. 
In 2000 the SSC began using a problem reporting tool, GNATS, to track defects and request changes to the SOS 
software.  GNATS is primarily used to keep track of known problems with the SOS, request new functionality in a SOS 
sub-system, and assign fixes and changes to builds.  The introduction of GNATS allowed the SSC to begin collecting 
metrics such as the amount of changes requested to SOS sub-systems and the number of defects found in the sub-
systems.  As the project approached launch it became increasingly important to confirm the stability of the SOS and 
prioritize testing.  Analysis of metrics assisted in these activities. 
This paper is an examination of the metrics gathering and analysis efforts at the SSC, primarily at the time shortly before 
Spitzer’s launch and during the In Orbit Checkout (IOC).   
2. METHODOLOGY 
2.1 GNATS Defect Tracking Tool 
Early on in the project the SSC System Engineering and Integration and Test (SEIT) team realized using a defect 
tracking tool would be a critical part of building a stable SOS.  The freeware tool GNATS1 was selected because it had 
the required minimum functionality (with minor modifications); the tool allowed the team to create reports of defects 
found in the SOS, request changes to the SOS, and assign fixes and changes to builds.  A report created in the GNATS 
tool is called a Problem Report (PR).  Figure 1 is diagram of the lifecycle of a PR.   
 
*susan@ipac.caltech.edu; www.spitzer.caltech.edu 
1www.gnu.org/software/gnats/ 
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Figure 1:  Life-cycle of a Problem Report in GNATS.   
A PR in any state other than “Rejected” or “Closed” is considered an open issue with the SOS. 
 
All PRs in GNATS start in the “New” state.  When a PR is entered an email is automatically sent to the team lead for the 
appropriate SOS sub-system.  Each PR is marked as either a Change Request (CR) or Anomaly Report (AR).  CRs are 
requests for new functionality while ARs are defects.  If a lead feels an AR is not a real defect (it is a user error, for 
example) he or she may move the PR to the “Rejected” state.  Otherwise the PR is generally moved to the “Assigned” 
state and assigned to a particular developer.  The SSC has a weekly Change Control Board (CCB) meeting to discuss 
open PRs and upcoming builds.  PRs in the “New” or “Assigned” state are assigned to a particular Target Release at that 
time.  The Target Release of a PR is the version number of the SOS the code will be built in.  If the CCB feels that a 
requested change is not desirable that PR is moved to the “Rejected” state.  If a change is deemed desirable, but will not 
be worked on in the near future or needs further investigation, it is moved to the “On-Hold” state. 
Once a PR is assigned to a Target Release the coding is begun.  The PR moved to the “Implemented” state when the 
work is complete and checked into source control.  The PR remains in the “Implemented” state until the build has been 
delivered to the SEIT team for testing.  At that time it is moved to the “Built” state by the Configuration Management 
lead.  This indicates it is ready to be tested. 
During a test cycle the SEIT team assigns PRs to particular test cases and verifies the fix was made or the requested 
functionality was added.  If a PR passes testing it is moved to the “Closed” state.  Otherwise, it is moved back to the 
“Assigned” state where eventually the CCB will designate it for a different Target Release.  While a PR is in any state 
other than “Rejected” or “Closed” it is considered an open issue with the SOS. 
When a PR is created it is assigned a unique identifier which allows users to find it and update it.  Table 1 lists the fields 
that can be filled out when the PR is created.  The fields which are most important when tracking an individual PR to 
closure are not necessarily those that are most useful when gathering metrics since metrics analysis is concerned with 
long term trends. 
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Table 1:  Information entered in GNATS when creating a PR. 
Field Use 
Reporter’s Email Email address of person who submitted the PR. 
CC Email List List of email addresses to copy on updates to the PR. 
Category SOS Sub-system the PR applies to. 
Synopsis One line description of the defect or requested functionality. 
Urgent Not used. 
Criticality 1 through 4.  Criticality 1 indicates a serious risk to Spitzer operations. (Added by modifying 
the GNATS source code.) 
Priority Not used. 
Class Change Request or Anomaly Report 
Submitter-Id Not used.  (Always set to “SSC”.) 
Originator Originator of the PR.  (Could be different than the reporter if originated by an outside user.) 
Release-Found Build version number the defect was found in. 
Target-Release Build the change will be incorporated into. (Added by modifying the GNATS source code.) 
Description Detailed description of the defect or requested change. 
File Attachments Additional material describing the defect or requested change. 
How-To-Repeat Steps that can be repeated to demonstrate the defect. 
Fix Filled in by the developer with what was done to fix the defect or add the requested change. 
 
2.2 The Need for Metrics Collection and Analysis 
As the Spitzer launch date approached part of the SEIT team’s preparation for IOC was proving the Level 3 SOS 
requirements had been met and passed testing, demonstrating the SOS was stable and had no serious defects that would 
prevent science operations, and devising a process for doing rapid builds during IOC.   
In order to prove requirements compliance the SEIT team went through the SOS Requirements from the Science 
Operation Requirements Document (SORD) and verified each requirement was assigned to a test case.  A matrix was 
created to trace the requirements to test cases.  For each requirement the table listed the associated test case, the status of 
the test case (Pass/Fail/NA), and any PRs created as a result of executing the test case.   
Before launch the SSC performed fewer than four major builds a year.  During IOC, however, the plan was to do one 
build every week in order to rapidly fix any defects found.  This meant that ARs had to be entered immediately and the 
CCB had to carefully prioritize the ARs and assign them to builds.  For the SEIT team, the significant change from the 
major builds was to determine where to focus testing resources in order to rapidly, but sufficiently, test builds. 
In an effort to help all of these activities GNATS PR metrics collection was begun.  The remainder of this section will 
describe the metrics which were collected and the format in which they were reported or presented.   
2.3 System Release Review 
For each SOS build a System Release Review (SRR) meeting is held to present changes to the SOS, test results, and 
deployment information to the stakeholders.  The SRR is attended by a representative from each team at the SSC, SCC 
management, the JPL Mission Manager, and representatives from JPL Quality Assurance and Configuration 
Management.  At the SRR management decides if the build will be accepted and deployed based on the information 
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presented in the presentation.  Five reports presented in the SRRs shortly before launch will be discussed below.  The 
reports were generated using metrics collected from GNATS by the SEIT team.   
The staffing resources required to create the reports were approximately one full time equivalent (FTE) for several days 
and the assistance of a part-time documentation person.  It was determined to be to the benefit of the project to devote 
those resources to generation of these slides.   
SSC AR Status by Software Release 
This report consisted of a table listing each build version of the SOS and giving the number of ARs which were New, 
Closed, Open, or Awaiting Verification at the time each build was released.    Only Anomaly Reports were counted, not 
Change Requests.   
For this report the New column totaled all ARs opened since the previous build’s release date.  Open totaled all ARs not 
in the   “Closed” or “Rejected” states.  Awaiting Verification totaled the ARs in the “Implemented” or “Built” state.  
Open totaled the remainder of the ARs.  Closed was the sum of Open ARs on the previous build’s release date plus the 
New ARs for this release minus the Open ARs for this release.  Table 2[1] gives an example of this report.   
 
Table 2:  Example of AR Status by Software Release Report 
Release Release Date New Closed Open 
Awaiting  
Verification 
S6.0 04/15/2002 258 163 234 0 
S6.1 05/26/2002 260 123 381 0 
S6.2 08/30/2002 113 155 132 196 
S6.3.1 11/22/2002 149 211 127 137 
S6.3.3 01/08/2003 51 150 119 46 
S7.0.0 03/14/2003 122 143 62 81 
S7.1.1 05/14/2003 96 118 61 60 
S7.5.1 06/09/2003 37 38 57 56 
S8.0 07/30/2003 92 84 59 68 
 
This table shows some interesting trends.  Starting with the S6.2 the SEIT was unable to test and close all ARs in 
GNATS by the time of the SOS deployment.  It is normal to have several ARs targeted for a future build Awaiting 
Verification at a SOS deployment, but the total of 196 is much higher than desired.  This indicates the number of 
changes incorporated in the SOS at that time may have been greater then the SEIT team had resources enough to handle. 
SSC Sub-System Stability-Over-Time  
For the SRR presentation a graph was made demonstrating the stability-over-time of each SOS sub-system.  These 
graphs were made by plotting the total number of CRs for the sub-system over time.  The thinking was that large number 
of changes to a system indicated the system was not becoming more stable over time.  Figure 2[1] shows the Stability-
Over-Time graph for the SOS Uplink sub-system Spot.  (Spot is the tool used by astronomers to plan observations and 
submit proposals.)  Figure 2 shows that as of August 2003 approximately 300 functionality changes had been requested 
in the Spot sub-system.  It is expected that as a sub-system becomes stable eventually the number of changes requested 
will plateau.   
Figure 3 shows the Spot Stability-over-time graph extended out to May 2007.  The graph shows that the number of 
functionality changes requested in Spot has not slowed over time.  This information can by used by management to 
when assigning development resources.  It is also extremely useful to the SEIT team, which uses risk to prioritize 
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testing.  Sub-systems with many changes may have had more defects introduced and might need more testing resources 
assigned to them. 
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Figure 2:  Example of Spot Stability-Over-Time Graph 
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Figure 3:  Spot Stability-Over-Time Graph extended through May 2007 
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SSC Sub-System Anomalies-Over-Time 
For the SRR presentations before launch a graph was made demonstrating the defects over time in each SOS segment 
(Uplink, Downlink, and Science Database Management).  These graphs were made by plotting the total number of ARs 
for the segment over time.  Figure 4[1] shows the total ARs by sub-system in the Uplink segment, broken out by sub-
system.  Figure 5[1] shows the total ARs further broken down by criticality. 
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Figure 4:  Example of Uplink Anomalies-Over-Time Graph (broken out by sub-system)  
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Figure 5:  Uplink Anomalies-Over-Time Graph (broken out by criticality)  
 
The type of information imparted by these graphs is extremely important to the SEIT for risk based testing.  From Figure 
5 it is appears that at that time Spot required more testing resources than AIRE because of the number of defects found 
in the sub-system.  What is not evident from the graphs, however, is that the AIRE sub-system is in the SOS critical path 
and therefore the changes allowed in the sub-system were more tightly controlled. Even though AIRE had fewer defects 
found, when testing resources were being assigned it was more important to the mission to have AIRE thoroughly tested 
than Spot.  Metrics analysis can highlight areas of concern in a project, but it doesn’t necessarily present the entire 
picture. 
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SORD Requirements Trace 
Since before launch, the SOS Test Report for every major build has contained a matrix tracing the SSC Level 3 
requirements to test cases.  The table has row for every SORD item, identified by paragraph number.  The following 
columns are filled are out after every test cycle:  Test Case number, Test Result (Pass/Fail/NA), ARs/CRs Created, Date 
Tested, and Comments.  This matrix allows the project to easily verify each of the SOS requirements was implemented 
and tested.  Figure 6[1] is a slide from the S8.0 SRR presentation which summarized the requirements testing results.   
  SORD
4
Traceability of Reqts performed 
  The following is a listing of the Science Operation System (SOS) 
Requirements from the Science Operation Requirements Document 
(SORD). A summary of the verification results as of Aug 1, 2003 is as 
follows:
  Total: 77 
Pass: 73 
Open: 4  
  Open (functionality deferred to S9.1+) 
  MIPS TP AOR 
• 2.1.3 Generate expansion from AOR 
• Science Data Archive 
• 2.5.4: Available via Internet with limited access to authorized portions 
• 2.5.6: Access data w/in 10 days of acquisition after 6 months into routine  
 
            mission 
• 2.5.7: Ensure privileged access until proprietary rights expire 
 
Figure 6:  Example of SORD Requirements Trace Summary 
SOS Line of Code Count 
For the SRR presentations before launch a graph was made demonstrating the lines of code in the SOS, broken out by 
segment (Uplink, Downlink, and Science Database Management).  Figure 7[1] shows an example of this graph.  The SOS 
had about 1.3 million lines of code at launch and has approximately 2 million lines of code at the current date. 
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Figure 7:  Example of Line of Code Count Graph 
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2.4 Weekly Reports 
During IOC the SSC began doing weekly builds of the SOS to rapidly fix any serious defects found.  Weekly reports 
were created for SSC management generated from PR metrics from GNATS collected by the SEIT team.  These reports 
were intended to keep management apprised of the state of the SOS.  Two of those weekly reports will be discussed 
below.  The reports were created by a part-time documentation person.   
Weekly SSC Anomaly Report Status 
Figure 8[2] demonstrates the number of PRs that were New, Close, Open, and Awaiting Verification over time. 
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Figure 8:  Example of SSC Anomaly Report Status Graph[1] 
 
The Closed line shows the total number of defects that have been fixed, tested, and released. It is expected that not all 
ARs would be closed immediately because lower criticality problems are targeted for builds that could be six months or 
a year in the future.  An example of a criticality 4 AR is a spelling error in a Help window.  It is a real problem, and 
should be fixed some day, but there are higher priority defects that should be fixed first.  
SSC Anomaly Report Status 
Tables 3 and 4 are from the weekly report generated on August 26, 2003 (one day after launch).  Table 3 contains all 
open ARs, broken down by criticality and segment.  Table 4 shows all ARs awaiting verification, also broken down by 
criticality and segment.  These two reports give a snapshot of the SOS.  The things management would be looking for 
would be:  no criticality 1 ARs, and the criticality of any open ARs in the Uplink or SDM segments.   
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Table 3:  Example of AR SSC Anomaly Report Status All Open ARs Table 
Segment/Criticality Uplink Downlink SDM/OPS Other Total 
1 0 0 0 0 0 
2 4 2 4 0 10 
3 13 4 5 1 23 
4/NA 13 2 0 1 16 
Total 30 8 9 2 49 
• Crit 1 Open: None 
 
    
 
Table 4:  Example of AR SSC Anomaly Report Status Awaiting Verification Table 
Segment/Criticality Uplink Downlink SDM/OPS Other Total 
1 0 0 0 0 0 
2 4 21 7 2 34 
3 2 27 13 1 43 
4/NA 0 2 0 1 3 
Total 6 50 20 4 80 
 
Along with the information shown in Tables 3[2] and 4[2], the weekly reports also listed the ARs scheduled for the next 
two weekly builds.  The slides in Figure 9[2] are also from the weekly report of August 26, 2003. 
 
Downlink S8.0 IRAC won't work properly with S8.0 Uplink due to HDR changesos24580
pmtool fails to X reference new observer id into programops-database-tools24552
no entry in filetypes for memoryDumpssdm-database24581
The stored function smallFloatToInterval fails on certain values.sdm-database24623
CAVE: unable to run it in Ops proposals databaseops-database-tools24665
hkloader error during ingest of HK data (value exceeds limit of integer precision)downlink-ipm24562
pointing thread fails due to plscripts tabledownlink-mips-ge24578
MIPS dark combine now failsdownlink-mips-ge24590
MIPS Dark plscriptid's need distinct priorities
downlink-pipeline-
exec24593
Duplicate entries for pipenum 346 in plinexyz.cdfdownlink-mips-ge24611
interp module fails to interp properlydownlink-mips-ge24615
Awaiting Verification  S8.1 ARs:
SetSchedWeight tool fails for "obscomment" optionops-database-tools24646
Modify the stored procedure proposalLogin to accept role "spot_read"sdm-proposal24700
"proposalfile" column getting cleared by Proposal Tool updateuplink-sut22319
Proposal submission: Program name error when submitting proposal updateuplink-sut24574
Open S8.2 ARs:
S8.0 Ops Checkout: FTZ not set up for some IST accountssos34661
dbtool - timing window durations, start/stop times in units of secondsops-database-tools34715
archtool - accessprogram routine cannot be resolvedops-database-tools24711
issues with updateCalExposureTypesandPlScriptIds
downlink-pipeline-
exec24712
Open S8.1 ARs:
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Correct error in database procedure releaseRequestsdm-database34701
dbtool - View -> view request window very jumbledops-database-tools34716
stacklayer does not work correctly for 160 mudownlink-mips-ge34699
reruningest.pl failuredownlink-pipeline-ing34706
FTZ java API is sending the wrong "bye" commandarchive24697
aorAcc tool failing for ATLO LF1+ AARsops-database-tools24600
plscriptid 27 fails in pointingrefine moduledownlink-irac24691
channel 3 darks ensemble fails with 64downlink-mips-ge24694
SPOT: auto-update requires two loginsuplink-sut24709
Awaiting Verification S8.2 ARs:
Some ecsv data is not getting deleted on FEI server after Ingestdownlink-pipeline-ing44566
Ensemble creation doesn't update APES master listoperations-pipeline34645
FTZ tool - grep errorsdm33857
OPS databases staging and archive have tables and procedures that should be removed.sdm-database34174
dbtool: minor bugsops-database-tools34554
pmtool - bugs and some suggested changesops-database-tools34631
archtool - bugs and suggested changesops-database-tools34636
No role set to run certifyCampaign (and others)sdm-database34671
Select permissionssdm-database34678
calkeywords not invoked for MIPS160 illumination correctiondownlink-mips-ge34510
in dlcs library fixed copying of the cd-matrix elements from the wcs structuredownlink-pipeline-prod34582
in sourcestimate move the bail out branch into the right placedownlink-pipeline-prod34583
fix a bug in sourcestimate that causes array access violation for a stack of > 1000 imagesdownlink-pipeline-prod34613
mean value greater than max valuedownlink-ipm34635
Sensitivity to NaNs in SLREMOV discovered in S7.5 Online pipeline testsdownlink-irs34639
problems with crosstalk in 7.5/S8.0 version: patch imminentdownlink-irs34641
bug in mopex.pl with naming interpolated uncertainty imagedownlink-pipeline-prod34663
Awaiting Verification  S8.1 ARs:  (Cont)
 
Figure 9:  Example List of ARs Scheduled for Upcoming Builds 
 
The ARs in the “Open” list in Figure 9 had been assigned to the S8.1 and S8.2 builds, but the coding had not been done 
yet.  The ARs in the “Awaiting Verification” list were implemented and checked into source control.   During IOC the 
CCB approved every AR that was assigned to a weekly build.   
2.5 Quarterly Reports for JPL QA 
Before launch the Jet Propulsion Laboratory Quality Assurance group required the SSC to generate quarterly reports 
giving the number of ARs open greater than ninety days.  It was not trivial for the SSC SEIT team to calculate this data 
since GNATS was not set up to do that type of query.  Table 4 shows the information that was collected for these 
reports.[3] 
  
Table 4:  Example of an SSC Quarterly Report to JPL QA 
On this date:   11/30/01 12/31/01 1/31/02 2/28/02 3/31/02 4/30/01 
Total ARs created (since 7/10/00): 545 566 606 691 766 861 
Of ARs currently open, # open > 90 days: 66 68 96 101 85 76 
Total ARs closed (since 7/10/00): 401 421 426 476 543 607 
Of total ARs closed above, # open > 90 days: 161 168 169 194 220 242 
Of total ARs created above, # open > 90 days: 227 236 265 295 305 318 
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3. RESULTS 
The graphs and tables listed under the SRR section continued to be generated for several releases after IOC.  As time 
went on, however, the number of FTEs in the SEIT group was reduced by nearly half and the team’s part-time 
documentation person left the project.  Metrics collection and documentation efforts had to be reduced to allow staff to 
focus on testing.  Many of the reports are no longer generated.  Before launch and during IOC, however, metrics analysis 
was very helpful for the SEIT team in focusing testing efforts for risk-based testing.  The SOS performed well during 
IOC, with no major defects found in the critical path. 
The SEIT team still does informal metrics analysis when planning a test cycle.  While no graphs or charts may be 
generated, the team still looks at what SOS sub-systems contain the high criticality ARs and which sub-systems contain 
the most CRs.  More testing time is spent on those sub-systems.   
Long term, it would have been useful to continue generating the system stability graphs for each sub-system.  As the 
graph in Figure 3 shows, several years after launch the changes requested in some sub-systems is not leveling off.  This 
information could be used to make staffing plans or as input to a discussion of when change requests should be frozen 
for the various sub-systems.  
4. CONCLUSIONS 
4.1 Staff Buy-In 
For various reasons it can be difficult to convince people to create PRs.  Developers sometimes don’t see the need to 
create a change request to add a small modification to the code.  Sometimes development group leads don’t like to see 
defect reports written against software they are responsible for.  People in general resist doing activities that are seen as 
paperwork with no value added.  In order to get staff buy-in everyone must understand what the purpose of the process 
is.  Defect reporting should not be used as an input to performance reviews, since that merely encourages people to not 
write defect reports. 
4.2 Defect Tracking Tool 
As a free tool, GNATS does not have much reporting capability built into it.  Future projects could reduce staffing 
resources for metrics collection and analysis by selecting a defect tracking system that had better reporting functionality.  
Considering the staff time required to perform the metrics collection over the years, it might have been worth the extra 
expense to purchase a system with reporting capabilities or to have written scripts to save effort. 
As Table 1 shows, there are three fields in a GNATS PR which are not used by the SSC.  Future projects should consider 
carefully which fields are really necessary in a defect report. 
4.3 Metrics Usage 
It is useful to begin metrics collection early in a project.  That way a baseline can be established and changes over time 
can be tracked.  The SSC should consider resuming generation of some reports such as the System Stability Over-Time 
graphs. 
The “Category” field in GNATS is used to track the sub-system the change or defect applies to.  In the Uplink segment, 
for example, there are many sub-systems such as Spot, SIRPASS, etc.  Using the category field allowed the SSC better 
insight into which particular area problems were being found in. 
Tracking the number of ARs open longer than ninety days did not prove useful for the SSC.  The SSC build cycle is such 
that even if a defect was fixed in the release immediately prior to the one in which it was found, it may have been open 
longer than ninety days.  Setting importance on an arbitrary date for closure discourages properly prioritizing defect 
fixes.  It doesn’t make sense to close a criticality four AR sooner than a criticality two AR simply because the first has 
been open longer. 
Analyzing metrics becomes difficult if changes are being introduced to a set of code that is used for multiple projects.  
The Uplink sub-system Spot has core code that is now being used by other missions.  The changes requested by other 
missions are being entered in a separate defect tracking system from GNATS.  In order to collect metrics for this sub-
system the SEIT team now needs to combine data from two different defect tracking systems. 
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Metrics collection is very useful for risk based testing.  When there are not enough testing staff resources to completely 
regression test a release, determining what sub-systems have risky changes is critical when planning a test cycle. 
Before beginning to collect metrics determine what the objective is and what kind of collection and analysis needs to be 
done to meet that objective.  This can help determine what kind of defect tracking system is necessary and what staffing 
resources will be required.  
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